Abstract. The paper proposes a logical systematization of the notion of countsas which is grounded on a very simple intuition about what counts-as statements actually mean, i.e., forms of classification. Moving from this analytical thesis the paper disentangles three semantically different readings of statements of the type "X counts as Y in context c", from the weaker notion of contextual classification to the stronger notion of constitutive rule. These many ways in which counts-as can be said are formally addressed by making use of modal logic techniques. The resulting framework allows for a formal characterization of all the involved notions and their reciprocal logical relationships.
Introduction
The term "counts-as" derives from the paradigmatic formulation that in [26] and [27] is attributed to the non-regulative component of institutions, i.e., constitutive rules:
[...] "institutions" are systems of constitutive rules. Every institutional fact is underlain by a (system of) rule(s) of the form "X counts as Y in context C" ( [26] , pp.51-52).
In legal theory the non-regulative component of normative systems has been labeled in ways that emphasize a classificatory, as opposed to a normative or regulative, character: conceptual rules ( [4] ), qualification norms ( [23] ), definitional norms ( [17] ). Constitutive rules are definitional in character:
"The rules for checkmate or touchdown must 'define' checkmate in chess or touchdown in American Football" ( [26] , p.43).
Considering this feature, a first reading of counts-as is readily available: it is plain that counts-as statements express classifications. For example, they express what is classified to be a checkmate in chess, or a touchdown in American Football. However, is this all that is involved in the meaning of counts-as statements?
The interpretation of counts-as in merely classificatory terms does not do justice to the notion which is stressed in the label "constitutive rule", that is, the notion of constitution. Aim of the paper is to show that this notion, as it is presented in some work in legal and social theory, is amenable to formal characterization and that the theory we developed in [15, 16] provides a ground for its understanding. The paper disentangles and analyzes three precise senses in which it can be said that "X counts as Y in context c". For each of these different senses of counts-as a formal semantics is developed by making use of standard modal logic techniques. From a methodological point of view, we will proceed as recommended here: "[. . . ] it seems to me obvious that the only rational approach to such problems would be the following: [1] We should reconcile ourselves with the fact that we are confronted, not with one concept, but with several different concepts which are denoted by one word; [2] we should try to make these concepts as clear as possible (by means of definition, or of an axiomatic procedure, or in some other way); [3] to avoid further confusions, we should agree to use different terms for different concepts; and then we may proceed to a quiet and systematic study of all concepts involved, which will exhibit their main properties and mutual relations" ( [29] , p. 355).
The structure of the paper reflects its method. Section 2 disentangles three different meanings of counts-as statements and exposes a first informal analysis. In Section 3 a modal logic of contextual classification is introduced and by means of it a formal analysis of the classificatory view of counts-as is provided. The two remaining senses of counts-as are formally analyzed in Sections 5 and 6. Finally, the relationships between the three readings are studied in Section 7. Conclusions follow in Section 8 and Appendix A proves soundness and completeness of the logics deployed in the formal analysis.
Counts-as between Classification and Constitution
Consider the following reasoning pattern.
Example 1.
It is a rule of normative system Γ that conveyances transporting people or goods count as vehicles; it is always the case that bikes count as conveyances transporting people or goods but not that bikes count as vehicles; therefore, in the context of normative system Γ , bikes count as vehicles. This is an instance of a typical reasoning pattern involving constitutive rules. The counts-as locution occurs three times. However, the second premise states a generally acknowledged classification ("bikes count as conveyances transporting people or goods"), while the conclusion states a classification which is considered to hold only with respect to the normative system at issue ("according to normative system Γ , bikes count as vehicles"). The first premise expresses something yet different, a classification which is brought about -constituted-by the normative system: "conveyances transporting people or goods are classified as vehicles" is one of the rules of Γ .
The classificatory reading of counts-as
The fact that "bikes count as conveyances transporting people or goods" can be readily analyzed as a form of classification: the concept 'bike' is a subconcept of the concept 'conveyance transporting people or goods' ( [12, 13, 15] ). Notice that this reading is aligned with the informal analysis of counts-as advanced in [18] : "There are usually constraints within any institution according to which certain states of affairs of a given type count as, or are to be classified as, states of affairs of another given type" ( [18] , p.431).
In Example 1, one of the premises was that bikes do not always count as vehicles. In other words, there are contexts in which 'bike' is not a subconcept of 'vehicle'. This suggests that a notion of context is necessary because classifications holding for a normative system are not of a universal kind, they do not hold in general. As a consequence, the classificatory reading of counts-as statements of the form "X counts-as Y in context c" runs as follows: "X is a subconcept of Y in context c". Following much literature on context theory (see for instance [9, 28] ) we conceive of a context simply as set of situations (possible worlds). What precisely these situations have to be in order to be considered a context will be clarified discussing the notion of constitutive rule (Section 2.3).
Classificatory counts-as will be formally studied in Section 3. A more extensive discussion of the intuitions underpinning the classificatory reading of counts-as statements can be found in [15, 16] .
Counts-as statements as proper classifications
The analytic literature on constitutive norms often emphasizes the following characteristic feature: counts-as statements are not just classifications but "new" classifications, that is, classifications which would not hold without the normative system stating them:
"Where the rule is purely regulative, behaviour which is in accordance with the rule could be given the same description or specification (the same answer to the question "What did he do?") whether or not the rule existed, provided the description or specification makes no explicit reference to the rule. But where the rule (or system of rules) is constitutive, behaviour which is in accordance with the rule can receive specifications or descriptions which it could not receive if the rule did not exist" ( [26] , p.35).
This was the case for the conclusion of the inference in Example 1: "in the context of normative system Γ , bikes count as vehicles" although this is not generally the case. In this view, counts-as statements do not only state contextual classifications, but they state new classifications which would not otherwise hold.
Observation 1 Counts-as statements are classifications which hold with respect to a context (set of situations) but which do not hold in general (i.e., with respect to all situations).
We call counts-as statements, intended in the sense of Observation 1, proper contextual classifications. In other words, X counts as Y in context c because X is classified as Y in c but also because this does not hold in general, i.e., in the global context. They state that something new is brought about and in this sense the notion of proper contextual classification already captures a precise notion of constitution: the fact that X is classified as Y is constituted by context c in the sense that out of context c it might not hold. Proper contextual classifications will be formally studied in Sections 4.1 5. A more detailed exposition of the intuitions behind the proper classificatory view on counts-as can be found in [16] .
Counts-as statements as constitutive rules
Example 1 sketched an inference grounded on a constitutive rule: "It is a rule of normative system Γ that conveyances transporting people or goods count as vehicles". First of all, this statement expresses a classification which is brought about by the normative system Γ ("conveyances transporting people or goods count as vehicles"), that is, what we called in the previous section a proper contextual classification. There is however something more. It explicitly states that a classification is one of the rules of Γ . This semantic ingredient is not captured by the classificatory and proper classificatory readings sketched in the previous sections and it involves two essential aspects.
The first one is that counts-as statements of the constitutive type are always part of a set of similar statements, the system of rules Γ .
"Rules are constitutive if and only if they are part of a set of rules. Strictly speaking, there is no such thing as a rule that is constitutive in isolation" ( [24] , p.5).
That is to say, a constitutive rule is constitutive only in as much it is part of that set. It is worth stressing how close this consideration lies to the warning raised in [20] : "no logic of norms without attention to a system of which they form part".
The second aspect concerns the relation between, on the one hand, the notion of a set of rules Γ , i.e., a normative system or institution, and on the other hand the notion of set of situations c, or context c. A Γ constitutes a context c by means of its rules. The set of classifications stated as constitutive rules by a normative system (for instance, "conveyances transporting people or goods count as vehicles") can be thought of as the set of situations which make that set of classifications true. Hence, the set of constitutive rules of any normative system can be seen as a set of situations. And a set of situations is what is called a context in much literature on context theory (see for instance [9, 28] ).
To put it shortly, a context is a set of situations, and if the constitutive rules of a given normative system Γ are satisfied by all and only the situations in a given set, then that set of situations is the context defined by Γ . This simple observation allows us to think of contexts as "systems of constitutive rules" ( [26] , p.51). Notice that this is no exotic thought. In fact, this idea has been neatly advanced -informally-in some literature on the theory of institutions: "A set of constitutive rules defines a logical space" ( [24] , p.6).
A logical space is nothing but a set of states, i.e., a context. Getting back to Example 1, consider the statement concluding the argument: "according to Γ , bikes count as vehicles". In this light such a statement just says that "in the set of situations defined by the rules of system Γ , bike is a subconcept of vehicle".
The discussion above is distilled in the following observation. Constitutive counts-as statements will be formally studied in Sections 4.2 and 6. To recapitulate, we distinguished between constitutive counts-as statements, proper classificatory counts-as statements and classificatory counts-as statements. When statements "X counts as Y in the context c of normative system Γ " are read as constitutive rules, what is meant is that the classification of X under Y is considered to be an explicit promulgation of the normative system Γ defining context c. Instead, when they are read as proper classificatory statements they are meant to denote classifications that are constituted, or brought about, by the context at issue in the sense that they might not hold with respect to another context. Finally, when they are read as mere contextual classification, they are meant to denote classificatory statements that are just the case in the given context .
Before proceeding with the formal analysis, it is worth noting that some literature on legal theory considers counts-as statements to be special kinds of constitutive rules and rejects a full identification between constitutive rules and counts-as statements. For example, [25] considers counts-as statements to typically concern the constitution of state-of-affairs which have no duration (e.g., committing a crime) while constitutive rules concern the constitution of state-of-affairs with duration, i.e., which can start and cease to hold (e.g., being a citizen). This is of course a terminological matter, and we chose to solve it by sticking to the Searlean view, where the identification "constitutive rule = counts-as" is quite clearly stated. Besides, it should also be said that, in order to introduce such a distinction between counts-as and constitutive rules, distinctions should also be introduced which allow to distinguish the specific nature of the X and Y terms occurring in the rules. The propositional logic setting assumed here abstracts from such distinctions by viewing X and Y simply as propositions whose further logical structure is left unspecified.
Modal logic of Classificatory Counts-as
This section summarizes the results presented in [15] . We first introduce the languages we are going to work with: propositional n-modal languages L n ( [2] ). The alphabet of L n contains: an at most countable set P of propositional atoms p; the set of boolean connectives {¬, ∧, ∨, →}; a finite non-empty set of n context indexes C, and the operators [ ] and . Metavariables i, j, ... are used for denoting elements of C. The set of well formed formulae φ of L n is then defined by the following BNF:
We will refer to formulae in which at least one modal operator occurs as modalized formulae. Modalized formulae in which all non-logical symbols occur in the scope of a modal operator are called contextual formulae. Formulae in which no modal operator occurs are called instead objective, and we denote them using the metavariables γ 1 , γ 2 , . . ..
Semantics
Semantics for these languages is given via structures M = F, I , where: -F is a CXT frame, i.e., a structure F = W, {W i } i∈C , where W is a finite set of states (possible worlds) and {W i } i∈C is a family of subsets of W 1 .
-I is an evaluation function I : P −→ P(W ) associating to each atom the set of states which make it true.
Such frames model thus n different contexts i which might be inconsistent, if the corresponding set W i is empty, or global if W i coincides with W itself. This implements in a straightforward way the thesis developed in context modeling according to which contexts can be soundly represented as sets of possible worlds ( [28] ). The satisfaction relation results in the following definition.
Definition 1. (Satisfaction based on CXT frames)
Let M be a model built on a CXT frame.
The obvious boolean clauses are omitted. Validity in a model, in a frame and in a class of frames are defined as usual.
It is instructive to make a remark about the [i]-operator clause, which can be seen as the characterizing feature of the modeling of contexts as sets of worlds 2 . It states that the truth of a modalized formula abstracts from the point of evaluation of the formula. In other words, the notion of "truth in a context i" is a global notion: [i]-formulae are either true in every state in the model or in none. This reflects the idea that what is true or false in a context does not depend on the world of evaluation, and this is what we would intuitively expect especially for contexts interpreted as normative systems: what holds in the context of a given normative system is not determined by the point of evaluation but just by the system in itself, i.e., by its rules: the fact that in Γ bikes count as vehicles depends only on the rules of Γ .
Axiomatics
The multi-modal logic that corresponds, i.e., that is sound and complete with respect to the class of CXT frames, is a system we call here K45 ij n . It consists of a logic weaker than the logic KD45 ij n investigated in [15] since the semantic constraint has been dropped which required the sets in family {W i } i∈C to be non-empty. As a consequence the D axiom has been eliminated. To put it in a nutshell, the system is the very same logic for contextual classification developed in [15] except for the fact the we want to allow here the representation of empty contexts as well. In the knowledge representation setting we are working in, where contexts can be identified with the normative systems defining them, this amounts to accept the possibility of normative systems issuing inconsistent constitutive rules.
Logic K45 ij n is axiomatized via the following axioms and rules schemata: (P) all tautologies of propositional calculus
where i, j denote elements of the set of indexes C. The system is a multi-modal homogeneous K45 with the two interaction axioms 4 ij and 5 ij . Soundness and completeness are proven in Section A.
A remark is in order especially with respect to axiomata 4 ij and 5 ij .
In fact, what the two schemata do, consists in making the nesting of the operators reducible which, leaving technicalities aside, means that truth and falsehood in contexts ( In other words, they express the fact that whether something holds in a context i is not something that a context j can influence. This is indeed the kind of property to be expected given the semantics presented in the previous section.
Classificatory Counts-as formalized
Using a multi-modal logic K45 ij n on a language ML n , the formal characterization of the classificatory view on counts-as statements runs as follows. 
We omit the proofs, which are straightforward via application of Definition 2. This system validates all the intuitive syntactic constraints isolated in [18] (validities 1-4). In addition, this semantic-oriented approach to classificatory counts-as enables the four validities 6-9. Besides, this analysis shows that counts-as conditionals, once they are viewed as conditionals of a classificatory nature, naturally satisfy reflexivity (5), transitivity (6), and a form of "contextualized" antisymmetry (7), strengthening of the antecedent (8) and weakening of the consequent (9).
Beyond Classificatory Counts-as
Aim of this section is to provide formal counterparts to Observations 1 and 2 which can work as intermediate step towards the development of suitable modal logics for the analysis of proper classificatory counts-as (Section 5) and constitutive counts-as (Section 6).
From classification to proper classification
As usual, model-theoretic considerations can give us crucial hints. Let us define the set T(X) of all formulae which, given a model, are satisfied by all worlds in a set of worlds X:
T(X) = {φ | ∀w ∈ X : M, w |= φ}.
and let T → (X) be the set of all implications between objective formulae γ 1 and γ 2 which are satisfied by all worlds in a set of worlds X:
Obviously, for every X: T → (X) ⊆ T(X). In the classificatory reading, given a model M where the set of worlds W c ⊆ W models context c, the set of all classificatory counts-as statements holding in c, which we denote as CL(W c ), can be defined as the set T → (W c ):
Hence, it is easy to see that:
In other words, the set of classificatory counts-as statements is: a subset of all the truths of W c ; a superset of all conditional truths of W , that is, of the "global" or "universal" context of model M.
While the first point represents a quite banal semantic constraint to which any formal characterization of counts-as should adhere, the second one is much more questionable. Indeed, what is true anyway is not characteristic of any context (except of the global one), and it cannot be properly said to represent any new truth. In other words, interpreting counts-as statements as mere classifications, as it has been done in Section 3 make them inherit all trivial classifications which hold globally in the model. This is the reason why classificatory counts-as, as shown in Proposition 1, behaves in a classical way enjoying antecedent strengthening as well as transitivity and reflexivity.
These considerations suggest a strategy for specifying the set of proper classificatory counts-as holding in a context c on the basis of T → (W c ). The problem boils down to eliminate from the set of classificatory counts-as CL for a context W c those classifications which hold globally, that is, which hold with respect to the global context W . We obtain, in this way, the set of proper classificatory counts-as statements, or proper contextual classifications, holding in context c in a CXT model M.
Definition 3. (Set of proper classificatory counts-as in c)
The set CL 
Intuitively, the set of proper classificatory count-as holding in c corresponds to the set of implications between objective formulae which hold in c, minus those implications which hold universally. Or, to put it otherwise, the set of proper classificatory count-as holding in c corresponds to the set of classificatory counts as of c, minus those implications which hold universally:
. This is the most natural amendment of the classificatory view toward the specification of a stronger notion of contextual classification along the lines of Observation 1.
From proper classification to constitution
Let us now focus on Observation 2. What plays a role there is the notion of a definition of the context of a counts-as statement. A definition of a context c, in a CXT model M, is a set of objective formulae 3 Γ such that ∀w ∈ W :
that is, the set of formulae Γ such that all and only the worlds in W c satisfy Γ in M. Observation 2 can now get a formal formulation. Given the set of formulae Γ , we say that any formula γ 1 → γ 2 ∈ Γ is a constitutive counts-as statement w.r.t. context c iff Γ defines context c and γ 1 → γ 2 belongs to the set of proper contextual classifications of c. 
Notice that CO(Γ, W c ) is defined taking as domain the set of implicative statements of Γ . Notice also that, as a result of this definition, if Γ does not define context W c then CO(Γ, W c ) = ∅. In fact, Formula 12 can be restated as follows:
Section 6 is devoted to the development of a modal logic based on this definition. The definitions discussed are summarized in the table below.
The table pinpoints the dependencies between the formal characterizations of the three different senses of counts-as which has been taken into consideration: the notion of constitution builds on the notion of proper contextual classification which in its turn builds on the notion of contextual classification. The modal logic analysis of contextual classification developed in Section 3 can thus be used as a sound starting point for the modal logic analysis of the two notions introduced in this section.
A methodological note
Before rendering the insights of Sections 4.1 and 4.2 in modal logic, it is worth making a methodological remark. We are here concerned with a term, "counts-as", which appears to have different meanings. At this point we had two main ways to pursue the formal characterization of counts-as we were aiming at. We could proceed axiomatically by trying to single out intuitive syntactic properties of counts-as statements. Or rather semantically, by trying to enrich the semantic characterization of the classificatory counts-as exposed in the previous sections in order to capture further semantic nuances. While formal approaches to counts-as ( [3, 8, 18] ) have been, up to now, characterized by an axiomatic perspective, we have instead chosen for a semantics-driven solution. With axiomatics perspective we mean that the formal analysis of counts-as proceeds, in those works, by singling out 'intuitive' axioms rather than trying to define the to-be-analyzed notion in terms of better understood ones 4 . This choice has been inspired by considering the methodological standpoint of fundamental work in philosophical logic such as [29, 30] .
The same issue we are facing here in analyzing counts-as lies also at the ground of the Tarskian characterization of the notion of truth and consists in the polysemy of the to-be-analyzed term. Because of the inherent polysemy of the predicate "to be true", Tarski found it unconvincing to proceed introducing the predicate as a primitive and then axiomatizing it: "[. . . ] the choice of axioms always has rather accidental character, depending on inessential factors (such as e.g. the actual state of our knowledge). [. . . ] a method of constructing a theory does not seem to be very natural [. . . ] if in this method the role of primitive concepts -thus of concepts whose meaning should appear evident-is played by concepts which have led to various misunderstanding in the past" ( [30] , pag. 405-406).
Instead, he preferred to first isolate a precise sense of the predicate, i.e., truth as correspondence to reality, and then to define it in terms of a better understood notion, i.e., the notion of satisfaction of a formula by a model. An axiomatic analysis of counts-as statements runs the danger alluded to in the quote: since it is not clear what counts-as statements actually mean, an axiomatization of them could result in mixing under the the same logical representation different semantic flavors that, from an analytical point of view, should be kept separated. A systematic discussion of this issue, specifically in relation with the proposal advanced in [18] , can be found in [16] .
The work presented in this paper is the result of the application of this method to the notion of counts-as: in Section 2 we first disentangled different meanings of the term "counts-as" providing a first map of its polysemy; in Section 3 we formally analyzed the first and more basic of these meanings explaining it in terms of a betterunderstood notion (strict implication within a context); in this section we have pointed at a first semantic characterization of the other two meanings and in the coming next two sections we will explain them by making use of better-understood modal logic notions: the negation of global statements (proper classificatory counts-as) and the definition of a context (constitutive counts-as).
Modal Logic of Counts-as as Proper Contextual Classification
In the following section a modal logic is developed which implements the definition stated in Formula 10 above. By doing this we will capture the intuitions discussed in Section 2 concerning the intuitive reading of counts-as statements in proper classificatory terms. At the same time we will maintain the possible worlds semantics of context exposed in Section 3 and developed in order to account for the purely classificatory view of counts-as.
Expansion of L n and semantics
Language L n is expanded as follows. The set of context indexes C is such that it always contains the special context index u denoting the universal (or global) context. We call this language L u n . Languages L u n are given a semantics via a special class of CXT frames, namely the class of CXT frames F = W, {W i } i∈C such that W ∈ {W i } i∈C . That is, the frames in this class, which we call CXT , always contain the global context among their contexts. The definition of the satisfaction relation for language L u n follows.
Definition 5. (Satisfaction based on CXT frames)
where u is the universal context index and c ranges on the context indexes in C. The obvious boolean clauses and the clauses for the dual modal operators are omitted.
The new clause states that the [u] operator is interpreted on the universal 1-frame contained in each CXT frame. It is therefore nothing but a S5 necessity operator.
Axiomatics
We call Cxt u the logic characterizing the class of CXT frames. Logic Cxt u results from the union K45 ij n ∪ S5 u ∪ {⊆ .ui)}, that is, from the union of K45 ij n with the S5 u logic for the [u] operator together with the interaction axiom ⊆ .ui below. The axiomatics runs thus as follows:
(P) all tautologies of propositional calculus 
Proper classificatory counts-as formalized
Using a multi-modal logic Cxt u on a language L u n , the proper classificatory reading of counts-as statements can be formalized as follows. 
Notice that this definition is nothing but the translation in the L 
We do not provide all the proofs, which can be obtained by constructing appropriate countermodels. We show a countermodel for Formula 16: ∀w ∈ W , M, w |= γ 1 → γ 3 ; ∀w ∈ W c , M, w |= γ 1 → γ 2 and M, w |= γ 2 → γ 3 ; and ∃w , w s.t. M, w |= γ 1 ∧ ¬γ 2 ∧ γ 3 and M, w |= ¬γ 1 ∧ γ 2 ∧ ¬γ 3 . It might be instructive to provide, at this point, an intuitive example for the failure of transitivity. Consider a public park regulation stating that self-propelled conveyances counts as (in the proper classificatory sense) vehicles, and that vehicles count as (in the proper classificatory sense) self-propelled conveyances. It follows that self-propelled conveyances counts as self-propelled conveyances, but this time, the counts-as can only be read in the classificatory sense. In fact, being a self-propelled conveyance logically, and therefore globally, implies being a self-propelled conveyance. Hence, such implication can not be a proper contextual classification. 
Contextualized antisymmetry, i.e., Formula 7 of Proposition 1 holds in the following form:
Cumulative transitivity (alias cut) is also valid:
Conditional versions of antecedent strengthening, consequent weakening and transitivity are valid:
We provide the deduction of Formula 24 as an example.
Propositions 2 and 3, although very simple, are of key importance for putting our characterization of counts-as as proper contextual classification in perspective with other proposals. Such a comparison is elaborated in detail in [16] .
Formulae 24-26 are also of interest since they show that some quite standard properties of contextual classifications are inherited by proper contextual classification in a conditionalized form, the condition being an assertion of invalidity (¬[u]). Proper classificatory counts-as statements are still monotonic, provided that the strengthened version of the antecedent does not universally imply the consequent. Similarly they are still transitive, provided that the implication between γ 1 and γ 3 is not a validity of the model. It is worth emphasizing the importance of these results from the perspective of conceptual analysis and their clarifying power. An alleged intuitive example of transitivity for counts-as statements, in a proper classificatory sense, can be such only under an appropriate invalidity assertion.
Modal Logic of Constitutive Counts-as
In this section a modal logic is developed which implements Definition 4. Again, the possible world semantics developed in order to account for the classificatory view of counts-as lies at the ground of the proposed framework.
Expanding L u n
Language L u n , which has been used in the previous section to deal with proper contextual classification, needs now further expansion. The language is expanded along two lines.
First, the set of context indexes C contains now a set K of m atomic indexes c among which the universal context index u, and the set of the negations −c of the atomic contexts, i.e., of the elements of K: C = K ∪ {−c | c ∈ K}. The cardinality n of C is therefore equal to 2m.
Second, the language needs also to contain an at most countable set N of nominals s disjoint from the set P of propositional atoms. Nominals are names for states in the model or, in other words, formulae that can be satisfied by only one state in the model. They can be freely combined with propositions to form well-formed formulae. The BNF is therefore extended as follows:
Metavariables for nominals are written as ν 1 , ν 2 , . . .. Modal languages containing nominals have recently been object of thorough study and are known as hybrid languages ( [2] ). The language obtained is called L u,− n . Nominals are chosen here in order to provide a sound and complete axiomatization of the logic based on the semantics presupposed by Definition 4. To be more precise, they are necessary in order to axiomatize the notion of complement of a context 5 . This will become evident by exposing the axiomatics (Section 6.3) and especially, from a technical point of view, in proving its completeness (Appendix A).
Semantics
A semantics to language L u,− n is given via a special class of CXT frames, namely the class of CXT frames F = W, {W i } i∈C such that there always exists a u ∈ C s.t. W u = W ; and such that for any atomic index c ∈ K there exists −c ∈ C such that:
That is, the frames in this class, which we call CXT ,\ , always contain the global context among their contexts and the complement of every atomic context.
The semantics for L u,− n is obtained interpreting the formulae on models built on CXT ,\ frames. However, because of the introduction of nominals, the evaluation function I should be redefined as a function I : P ∪ N −→ P(W ) satisfying the following constraints:
-For all nominals s ∈ N, I(s) is a singleton set, that is, nominals always denote one and only one state in the model.
-For all states w ∈ W , there exists a nominal s ∈ N such that I(s) = w, that is, each state has a name. In other words, the restriction of the interpretation function I on the set of nominals (N I) is a surjection on the set of all singletons of W .
Following [7] , models with valuations satisfying the conditions above are called surjective models. The definition of the satisfaction relation for language L u,− n runs as follows.
Definition 7. (Satisfaction based on CXT
,\ frames) Let M be a surjective model built on a CXT ,\ frame.
where u is the universal context index and c ranges on the context indexes in C, and s is a nominal. The obvious boolean clauses and the clauses for the dual modal operators are omitted.

Surjective models on CXT
,\ frames will be referred to as CXT ,\ models. The first clause states the satisfaction relation for nominals: a nominal s is true in a state w in model M iff the evaluation function associates w to s. Nominals are therefore objective formulae which are true in at most one world. The second clause, which was already introduced in Definition 5, states that the [u] operator is interpreted on the universal frame contained in each CXT ,\ frame. The third one is just the standard clause for contextual truth introduced in Definition 1. 
where ¬Γ has to be intended in the obvious sense of the disjunction of the negations of all formulae in Γ . Formula 27 is an object language modal translation of the property stated in Formula 11.
Proposition 4. (Equivalence of Formulae 11 and 27) Let M be a CXT model and M be a model on a CXT ,\ frame such that: M is based on a frame having the same domain of the frame on which M is based, and which contains all its contexts; propositional atoms get the same evaluation in M and M. It is the case that, given a set of objective formulae Γ and a context
Proof. The proof is based on the semantics provided in Definition 7. By construction of M , the clause "if w ∈ W c then M, w |= Γ " is equivalent to "if w ∈ W c then M , w |= Γ ", and therefore equivalent to M |= [c]Γ . Analogously, the clause "if w ∈ W c then M, w |= Γ " is equivalent to "if w ∈ W \W c then M , w |= ¬Γ ", and therefore equivalent to M |= [−c]¬Γ .
In practice, we are making use, in a different setting but with similar purposes, of a wellknown technique developed in the modal logic of knowledge, i.e., the interpretation of modal operators on 'inaccessible states' typical, for instance, of the "all that I know" epistemic logic ( [19] ). In our case, the set of inaccessible states is nothing but the complement of a context.
Axiomatics
To axiomatize the above semantics an extension of logic K45 ij n is needed which can characterize nominals as names for modal states and, consequently, context complementation. The extension, which we call logic Cxt u,− , results by adding to Cxt u a group of two axioms (Least and Most) and one rule (Name) which axiomatize nominals, and a group of two axioms (Covering and Packing) which axiomatize context complementation. The axiomatics runs as follows:
where i, j are metavariables for the elements of K, c denotes elements of the set of atomic context indexes C, u is the universal context index, ν ranges over nominals, and θ in rule Name denotes a formula in which the nominal denoted by ν does not occur. The proofs of soundness and completeness of the axiomatization w.r.t. CXT ,\ frames are provided in Appendix A.
The new axioms and rules deserve some comments. Let us start with the axiomatization of nominals. Axiom Least states just that every nominal denotes at least one state. Vice versa, axiom Most states that nominals denote at most one state. Intuitively it says that, if there is a state named ν where φ holds, then φ holds if ν is the case. Finally, rule Name is a rule with side conditions borrowed from standard hybrid logic ( [2] ). It forces all states to be nominated. It does that by saying that if it is provable that a formula θ holds at an arbitrary state ν -the state is arbitrary since the rule requires ν not to occur in θ-then θ itself is provable since there is no world that falsifies it. From a technical point of view, as observed in [7, 21] , this rule ensures that in any definable set of the model, i.e., set of states in which some modal formula is true, at least one state can be picked which is named by N I. This guarantees function N I to be a surjection on the set of all definable singletons of W 6 . To sum up, axioms Least and Most with rule Name axiomatize the conditions holding on the interpretation function I as exposed in Section 6.2.
Let us now discuss the axioms that are more central to the modeling aim we are pursuing: axioms Covering and Packing. They characterize context complementation. Axiom Covering states that if some formula holds in both c and −c, than it holds globally. To put it otherwise, it states that the universal context is covered by the contexts denoted by c and, respectively, −c. Axiom Packing states then that the contexts denoted by c and −c are strongly disjoint, in the sense that they do not contain the same states. They pack the universal context in two disjoint subcontexts. Axioms Covering and Packing are therefore just modal formulations of the two properties characterizing the bipartition of a given set. Notice that nominals are necessary in the formulation of the Packing axiom. It is easy to see that, without the possibility of naming individual states, it would be impossible to axiomatize disjointness 7 .
A remark: Cxt u,− as hybrid logic
Before putting the formalism at work, it might be instructive to make one last technical remark. In logic Cxt u,− a family {@ ν } ν∈N of operators is definable, by means of which it is possible to express that a formula φ holds in the state named ν: @ ν φ. This operator is known in hybrid logics ( [2] ) as the satisfaction operator. Its semantics is given in terms of the following clause:
The property of "holding in a state" is thus a global property, that is, it is independent of the point of evaluation. The clause states more precisely that, whatever the state of evaluation is, it is the case that if s holds then φ also holds. In fact, the satisfaction operator can be defined in any logic enabling nominals and a universal modality ( [1, 11] ) as follows:
where @ ν is a nominal and φ a formula. Leaving technicalities aside, this means that logic Cxt u,− has sufficient expressive means to represent statements of the type "in situation (or state) ν state-of-affairs φ holds". This expressive capability of logic Cxt 
with γ 1 and γ 2 objective formulae.
The definition implements in modal logic the intuition summarized in Observation 2, and formalized in Definition 4: constitutive counts-as statements correspond to those non trivial classifications which are stated by the definition Γ of the context c. In fact the following can be proven.
Proposition 5. (Equivalence of Definitions 8 and 4)
Let M be a CXT ,\ frame and Γ a set of objective formulae. It is the case that:
Proof. The proof follows from Proposition 4 and Definition 8.
A detailed comment of Definition 8 is in order. Its most important consequence is that it is possible to talk about constitutive counts-as only once a set Γ is given. As already stressed in Section 2.3, there is no formula that is constitutive in isolation from a set of rules.
Secondly, notice that a constitutive counts-as is false if either Γ does not define the context denoted by c, or if it expresses a classification which is valid in the model. This is the distinctive feature of constitutive counts-as with respect to its two classificatory relatives. While the classificatory versions of counts-as express what at least holds in a context (contextual classification) and, respectively, what at least hold in a context which is not globally true (proper contextual classification), the constitutive version expresses also what at most holds in a context, thereby making explicit what the context actually is in terms of a set of formulae of the language. We can have a constitutive counts-as statement only if it is known what the definition is of the context at issue. In the classificatory versions of counts-as this knowledge is absent since it is only partially known what the context explicitly is. Classificatory and proper classificatory countsas statements presuppose the existence of a context of which only some information is available. From a technical point of view, this linguistic dependence corresponds to the fact that γ 1 ⇒ co c,Γ γ 2 formulae are defined only for pairs of formulae (γ 1 , γ 2 ) s.t. γ 1 → γ 2 ∈ Γ . To put it another way, symbols ⇒ co c,Γ are not genuine connectives. As a consequence, it is not possible to study ⇒ co c,Γ conditionals from a structural perspective like it has been done for the other forms of counts-as in Propositions 1, 2 and 3.
How awkward this might sound it is perfectly aligned with the intuitions on the notion of constitution which backed Definition 8: constitutive counts-as are those classifications which are explicitly stated in the specification of the normative system. In a sense, constitutive statements are just given, and that is it. This does not mean, however, that constitutive statements cannot be used to perform reasoning. The following example depicts the most typical form of reasoning involving constitutive counts-as statements.
The following formula is valid in CXT ,\ frames for any Γ containing γ 1 → γ 2 :
Proof. Follows from Definition 4, Formula 28 and propositional logic.
This property shows how constitutive rules work in providing grounds for inferring the occurrence of new states-of-affairs: it is a rule of the normative system of Utrecht University that if the promotor pronounces the PhD. student to be a doctor then this counts as the PhD. student to be a doctor (γ 1 ⇒ co c,Γ γ 2 ); the current situation ν falls under the rules of Utrecht University (@ ν Γ ) and in the current situation the promotor pronounces a PhD. student to be a doctor (@ ν γ 1 ), hence in the current situation the PhD. student is a doctor (@ ν γ 2 ).
It is remarkable that Formula 29 perfectly depicts the notion of "conventional generation" as described in [10] : Complex reasoning patterns involving constitutive counts-as statements arise also in relation with the other two notions of counts-as. The following section investigates the logical relationships between the three different senses of counts-as. Complex reasoning patterns involving constitutive counts-as statements arise also in relation with the other two notions of counts-as. The following section investigates the logical relationships between the three different senses of counts-as.
Relating the many faces of counts-as
This section is devoted to pursuing the last goal mentioned in the quote from [29] mentioned in Section 1: "and then we may proceed to a quiet and systematic study of all concepts involved, which will exhibit their main properties and mutual relations." The logical relations between ⇒ 
Proof. The validity of Formula 30 follows directly from Definitions 2 and 6:
). The validity of Formula 31 follows from the validity of Formula 30, the validity of Formula 8 for ⇒ [18] , the possibility of applying specific classificatory rules. If it is a rule of Γ that self-propelled conveyances count as vehicles (constitutive sense) then self-propelled conveyances count as vehicles (proper classificatory sense) in the context c defined by Γ .
The following two propositions display further interesting consequences of Definition 6 concerning the relation between constitution and classification. 
Proof. The proposition is easily proven considering that Definition 6 yields that Formula 34 is equivalent to: 
Proof. The proposition follow directly from Definitions 6 and 8. From Definition 6 it follows that Formula 36 implies:
. The same follows from Definition 8, which proves Formula 37.
Formulae 36 and 37 express that what is taken to be globally the case can not be a proper contextual classification and can not be used to constitute a context. The reason for this is that global truths hold in all contexts, and therefore, they can not be specific of any one. To put it in yet another way, if something is considered to be a proper contextual counts-as or a constitutive one, then it is also presupposed that what stated by the counts-as can possibly not be the case. For instance, if we take "apples are fruits" to be a global truth of our reality, then "apples count as fruits" can not be a constitutive rule since it adds nothing to what is already the case. On the contrary, if we take "apples count as fruits" to be one of the constitutive rules of a system Γ then we are assuming that in some cases apples are not classified as fruits.
Let us now take into consideration properties displaying more complex reasoning patterns. The following formulae are valid in CXT ,\ frames:
provided that
Proof. The proof of Formula 38 is straightforward from Definition 2, Definition 8, Proposition 3 and the transitivity of classificatory counts-as (Proposition 1). Formula 39 is proven by just adding the application of Definition 6 to the the proof of Formula 38.
These properties represent typical forms of reasoning patterns involving constitutive rules. Formula 38: if it is a rule of Γ that γ 2 → γ 3 ("self-propelled conveyances count as vehicles") and it is always the case that γ 1 → γ 2 ("cars count as self-propelled conveyances"), then γ 1 → γ 3 ("cars count as vehicles") holds in the context c defined by normative system Γ . Formula 39: if it is a rule of Γ that γ 2 → γ 3 ("conveyances transporting people or goods count as vehicles") and it is always the case that γ 1 → γ 2 ("bikes count as conveyances transporting people or goods") but it is not always the case that γ 1 → γ 3 ("bikes count as vehicles"), then γ 1 → γ 3 ("bikes count as vehicles") holds as a constituted classification in the context c defined by normative system Γ . Notice that while "cars count as self-propelled conveyances" is a classificatory countsas, since it might still be the case that cars are globally classified as vehicles, "bikes count as vehicles" is instead a proper classificatory counts-as since it is explicitly stated that such classification is not a validity. Formula 39 represents nothing but the form of the reasoning pattern that has been used as example in Section 2.3 to introduce the notion of constitution.
The remarkable aspect about these properties is that they neatly show how the three senses of counts-as all play a role in the kind of reasoning we perform with constitutive rules. In particular, they show that the constitutive sense, though not enjoying any structural property, grounds in fact all the rich reasoning patterns proper of classificatory reasoning. The 'transfer problem' has been introduced in [18] as a landmark for testing the intuitive adequacy of formalizations of counts-as. It can be exemplified as follows: suppose that somebody brings it about -for instance by coercion-that a priest effectuates a marriage, does this count as the creation of a state of marriage? Does anything implying that a priest effectuates a marriage count as the creation of a state of marriage? In other words, is the possibility to create a marriage transferable to anybody who brings it about that the priest effectuates the ceremony? In our framework, these questions get a triple formulation, one for each of the different senses of counts-as.
The transfer problem and ⇒ cl c In [18] , the transfer problem has been used as grounds for the rejection of the property of antecedent strengthening for counts-as conditionals. It is beyond doubt that a characterization of counts-as which enjoys the strengthening of the antecedent also exhibits the transfer problem: if that property holds, then the fact that the performance of the ceremony counts as the creation of a state of marriage implies that also a coerced performance does. As already noticed in [15] , contextual classification (⇒ cl c ), which enjoys the strengthening of the antecedent (Proposition 1), does exhibit the transfer problem: whatever situation in which a priest performs a marriage ceremony is classified as a situation in which a marriage state comes to be. And this is precisely what we intuitively expect given the notion of contextual classification as informally introduced in Section 2. In other words, contextual classification should exhibit the transfer problem or, to put it another way, it should display a transfer property: the creation of a state of marriage is transferable to any state in which a priest performs the appropriate ceremony.
The transfer problem and ⇒ cl+ c
It has been shown that the characterization of proper contextual classification (⇒ cl+ c ) does not enjoy the strengthening of the antecedent (Proposition 2). From a mere conditional logic perspective, such as the one assumed in [18] , this would be enough to rule out the occurrence of the transfer problem.
However, it seems this is quite not the case, the reason being that the transfer problem has manifestations which go beyond the structural rule of antecedent strengthening. The follwing formula, proven valid in Proposition 3, also expresses an instance of the transfer problem:
Intuitively, if the fact that a priest effectuates a marriage (γ 1 ) under coercion of a third party (γ 3 ) is not globally classified as giving rise to a state of marriage (γ 2 ) -which is the case, given the intuitive reading of the scenario at issue-then it is safe to say that if the priest's performance of the marriage counts as (in a proper classificatory sense) a marriage, then a coerced performance of the marriage counts also as a marriage.
Notice that this is again something perfectly intuitive given the assumptions about proper contextual classification exposed in Section 4: if a context c makes a classification γ 1 → γ 2 true, which does not hold in general, then also the strengthened version of it, i.e., γ 1 ∧ γ 3 → γ 2 , is true in that context. Besides, if the strengthened version is also not true in general, it then follows that γ 1 ∧ γ 3 → γ 2 is also a novel classification which is brought about by context c. Exhibiting the transfer problem is also for proper contextual classification not problematic.
From a technical point of view, Proposition 3 shows that a characterization of counts-as, which does not enjoy the strengthening of the antecedent, can still exhibit the transfer problem. This is a point worth stressing because, by assuming a purely conditional perspective like in [18] , instances of the transfer problem such as the one represented in the above formula could simply not be expressed.
To conclude, proper contextual classification does not exhibit the transfer problem, if by "transfer problem" we just mean the rejection of antecedent strengthening, like it was proposed in [18] . On the other hand, if we consider broader forms of the problem which did not get a formulation in [18] , then proper contextual classification does exhibit it. co c,Γ The constitutive reading of counts-as statements does not exhibit any of the considered forms of the transfer problem. Counts-as statements represent the rules specifying a normative system. So, all that it is explicitly stated by the 'institution of marriage' is that if the priest performs the ceremony then the couple is married. No rule belongs to that institution which states that the action of a third party bringing it about that the priest performs the ceremony also counts as a marriage. Our formalization fully captures this feature. Let the 'marriage institution' c be represented by the set of rules Γ = {p → m}, i.e., by the rule "if the priest performs the ceremony, then the couple is married". Let then t represent the fact that a third party brings it about that p. For Definition 8 the counts-as (t ∧ p) ⇒ co c,Γ m is just an undefined expression, because ((t ∧ p) → m) ∈ Γ , that is, because the 'marriage institution' does not state such a classification.
Conclusions
Moving from hints provided by the literature on legal and social theory concerning constitutive rules, the paper has analyzed counts-as statements as forms of contextual classifications. This analytical option, which we have studied from a formal semantics perspective, has delivered three semantically precise senses (Definitions 2, 6 and 8) in which counts-as statements can be interpreted, which we called classificatory, proper classificatory and constitutive readings. The three readings have then been formally analyzed making use of modal logic.
The classificatory reading resulted in a strong logic of counts-as conditionals enabling many properties which are typical of reasoning with concept subsumptions such as, in particular, reflexivity, strengthening of the antecedent and weakening of the consequent (Proposition 1). In fact, the logic obtained is nothing but a modal logic version of the contextual terminological logic we investigated in [12, 13] .
The characterization of proper contextual classification resulted, instead, in a much weaker logic rejecting reflexivity, transitivity and antecedent strengthening (Proposition 2), but retaining cumulative transitivity (Proposition 3). Noticeably, this notion corresponds to the counts-as characterized in [18] once transitivity is substituted with cumulative transitivity. Finally, the notion of proper contextual classification has offered some new insights on the transfer problem (Section 7.1) showing that it cannot be genuinely avoided just by means of rejecting the strengthening of the antecedent in a conditional logic setting. This result motivated the investigation of a yet stronger form of counts-as which we developed in [14] , and which stems nevertheless from the same analytical option backing the present work.
The formal analysis of constitutive counts-as (Definition 8) has neatly shown, with formal means, in what sense constitutive rules are never constitutive in isolation, but only as parts of systems of rules, and how constitutive rules work in providing grounds for attributing institutional properties to situations (Proposition 6). Constitutive countsas has also been shown to imply the two classificatory readings (Proposition 7). Other logical interrelationships between the three notions of counts-as have also been studied (Propositions 8 and 10) showing also that the logical relations between them could actually be grounds for fallacies in the formal characterization of counts-as once the polysemy of the term "counts-as" is overlooked.
A Soundness and Completeness
This appendix proves soundness and completeness of the logics we have introduced for the analysis of counts-as: K45 ij n , Cxt u and Cxt u,− . The strong completeness of these logics will be proven via the canonical model technique.
A.1 Logics K45
ij n and Cxt u Logics K45 ij n and Cxt u are normal modal logics, i.e., the axiomatization of every modality [i] contains all tautologies of propositional calculus, axiom K and is closed under rules MP and N. A normal modal logic Λ is strongly complete w.r.t. a class F of frames if for any set of formulae Φ and formula φ, if Φ semantically entails φ then φ is derivable from Φ in Λ: if Φ |= F φ then Φ Λ φ.
First, some well-known definitions and general results about modal completeness theory of normal modal logics are listed. We refer the reader to [2] for further details.
Let us, first of all, recall some facts about maximal consistent sets. Let Λ be a multimodal normal logic. A maximal Λ-consistent set of formulae on a multi-modal language L n is a set Φ s.t.: (a) ⊥ is not derivable in Λ from Φ (i.e., Λ-consistency of Φ); (b) every set properly including Φ is Λ-inconsistent. Every maximal Λ-consistent set Φ is such that: Λ ⊆ Φ; Φ is closed under rule MP; for all formulae φ either φ ∈ Φ or ¬φ ∈ Φ; for all formulae φ, ψ : φ ∨ ψ ∈ Φ iff φ ∈ Φ or ψ ∈ Φ. We can now report the notion of canonical model for a logic Λ. We briefly recall four key propositions of (modal) completeness theory. For the proofs we refer the reader to [2] .
Proposition 11. (Redifining strong completeness)
A normal modal logic Λ is strongly complete w.r.t. a class of frames F iff every Λ-consistent set of formulae is satisfiable on some F ∈ F, i.e., it has a model M built on a frame F in class F.
Lemma 1. (Existence Lemma)
For any normal modal logic Λ and any state w ∈ W Λ , it holds that: if i φ ∈ w then there exists a state w ∈ W Λ such that wR Λ i w and φ ∈ w .
Lemma 2. (Truth Lemma)
For any normal modal logic Λ and any formula φ, it holds that: M Λ , w |= φ iff φ ∈ w.
